Abstract. We present a robust multiparty computation protocol. The protocol is for the cryptographic model with open channels and a polytime adversary, and allows n parties to actively securely evaluate any poly-sized circuit with resilience t < n/2. The total communication complexity in bits over the point-to-point channels is O(Snκ + n BC), where S is the size of the circuit being securely evaluated, κ is the security parameter and BC is the communication complexity of one broadcast of a κ-bit value. This means the average number of bits sent and received by a single party is O(Sκ + BC), which is almost independent of the number of participating parties. This is the first robust multiparty computation protocol with this property.
Introduction
Efficient Multiparty Computation. A multiparty computation (MPC) protocol allows n parties to compute an agreed-upon function of their inputs in such a way that every party learns the correct function output, but no party learns any additional information about the other parties' inputs. A protocol is said to be t-robust if this holds even if up to t of the parties, called the corrupted parties, in a coordinated manner try to falsify the protocol output by sending wrong messages, and try to learn extra information by pooling the values that they learned in the protocol.
Since the publication of the first MPC protocols [Yao82, GMW87, CDG87, BGW88, CCD88, RB89, Bea91b] a lot of research went into improving the communication complexity [GV87, BB89, BMR90, BFKR90, Bea91a, FH96, GRR98, CDD + 99, CDM00, CDD00, HMP00]. In [HM01] it was shown that any circuit with S gates can be computed unconditionally secure and t-robust for t < n/3 with communication complexity O(Sn 2 κ + n 2 BC), where κ is the size of the elements of the field secret-sharing is done over and BC is the communication complexity of broadcasting a κ-bit value. Recently, similar communication complexities were achieved for t < n/2, once with cryptographic security (O(Sn 2 κ + n BC), where κ is the security parameter, [HN05] ), and once with information-theoretic security (O(Sn 2 κ + n 3 BC), [BH05] ). In these protocols there is an overall O(n) to O(n 3 ) broadcasts, and besides this the only communication is from each party sending an average of O(κ) bits to each other party per gate to be evaluated.
Our Contributions. In this paper we show that, maybe somewhat surprisingly, a circuit with S gates can be computed cryptographically secure and t-robust for t < n/2 with communication complexity O(Snκ + n BC). This means that the average number of bits sent and received by a single party is O(Sκ + BC), which is almost independent of the number of participating parties. In particular, each party does not send messages to each of the other parties to evaluate a gate.
In contrast to many other efficient MPC protocols, the stated complexity holds also for circuits with many inputs and outputs, i.e., we give realizations with linear complexity for input, addition, multiplication, random, local output, and global output gates.
Related Work. In concurrent and independent work [DI06] , it was showed that a circuit with S gates can be computed t-robust with communication complexity O Sn poly(κ) . Their protocol is constant-round and can be proven adaptively secure, in contrast to our protocol which requires linear rounds and is proven only static secure. However, their protocol only achieves sub-optimal resilience (essentially t < n/5), whereas our protocol achieves optimal resilience (t < n/2).
Protocol Overview
Our MPC protocol follows the approach with homomorphic encryption of [CDN01] : We assume that a homomorphic encryption scheme is available, where the encryption key is known to all parties, and the decryption key is shared among the parties such that we have verifiable threshold decryption. The function to be computed is represented as an arithmetic circuit with input, addition (resp. linear), multiplication, random, and output gates. The evaluation proceeds gate-by-gate, i.e., for each gate an encryption of its value is computed.
Furthermore, we use segmentation and player elimination [HMP00] : The circuit is divided into n segments of (almost) equal size, and the parties evaluate one segment after each other. The evaluation of a segment may fail, but in this case, two parties, (at least) one of them being corrupted, are identified and eliminated, and the segment is repeated. Note that at most t times a segment can fail and must be repeated, hence the adversary can at most double the overall costs. Also note that, as we have an honest majority in the original party set, we also have honest majority in the party set resulting from a sequence of eliminations.
When a segment is to be evaluated, an arbitrary (non-eliminated) party is selected to be the king for this segment [HNP05] . Most sub-protocols are so-called king-fail-detect protocols, i.e., when cheating occurs, then the sub-protocol may fail, but then this must be detected by at least one honest party, and the king must be able to identify a cheater.
The actual evaluation of a segment follows the circuit-randomization approach of [Bea91b] : First, the parties generate one multiplication triple (A, B, C) for each multiplication and each random gate in the segment, where A and B are encryptions of random values and C is an encryption of their product. Then the parties evaluate the segment gate by gate, where for evaluating a multiplication or a random gate, one multiplication triple is consumed. The generation of the random values is based on super-invertible matrices: This technique allows us to transform n encryptions of random values, t of them known to the adversary, into n − t encryptions of random values unknown to the adversary. Furthermore, we use homomorphic proof systems, i.e., proofs that allow to combine several proofs into a single, compact proof. Finally we introduce the notion of strong soundness for a Σ-protocol, which allows to turn Σ-protocols into zero-knowledge proofs by challenging with an unpredictable, but deterministic value.
Preliminaries
The Security Model. Our protocols can be proven secure in the UC model [Can01] against a static, actively corrupted minority. The page limit is however far from allowing us full simulation proofs, and we therefore do not need to introduce the UC model in detail. However we briefly sketch the used communication model.
We assume that at the beginning a party set P = {P 1 , . . . , P n } is given, and all parties P i ∈ P agree on this set. Furthermore, the parties P i ∈ P have access to synchronous, authenticated point-to-point channels. The corrupted parties are modeled by a probabilistic poly-time (PPT) Turing machine A, the adversary. Before the execution of the protocol A gets to pick a subset C ⊂ P of size |C| < n/2, the corrupted parties. Then the protocol is executed. The adversary decides the scheduling of the honest parties, with the only restriction that in each round each honest party is scheduled exactly once. The adversary sees all messages sent, and can chooses the messages to be sent by corrupted parties based on this.
Broadcast. We assume a protocol broadcast for broadcasting values. Some party P i ∈ P has input (P i , m) and the remaining parties have input (P i ). The output of all parties will be (P i , m). The parties will output a common value (P i , m ) even when P i is corrupted. We will only broadcast O(κ)-bit values, where κ is the security parameter, and we use BC to denote the communication complexity of broadcasting O(κ)-bit values. In the analysis of the communication complexity we assume that BC ≥ O(n 2 κ), as this is the complexity of the most efficient broadcast protocol for the cryptographic model [Nie03] .
Threshold Signature Schemes. We also need a threshold signature scheme. Here all parties know the verification key vk and the signing key sk is shared among the n parties, with P i holding a secret signing-key share sk i . A party P i can compute a signature share σ i = sig ski (m) and prove in zero-knowledge that σ i is a valid signature share from P i on m. There is a threshold t < n such that given a signature share σ i on m from t + 1 parties one can compute sig sk (m) = σ = combine({σ i } i ), and given t of the keys sk i a poly-time adversary cannot compute a signature on any message m on which it did not receive sig ski (m) from at least one honest P i .
Super-Invertible Matrices. We use super-invertible matrices over Z N . Given a matrix M = {m i,j ∈ Z N } j=1,...,c i=1,...,r with r rows and c columns and a subset C ⊂ {1, . . . , c} we let M C = {m i,j } j∈C i=1,...,r denote the matrix consisting of columns j ∈ C from M . If c = r we call M invertible if its columns are linear independent over Z N . If c ≥ r we call M super-invertible if M C is invertible for all C ⊂ {1, . . . , c} with |C| = r. If {1, . . . , c} all are mutually prime with N , as will be the case later, a simple construction exists. For i = 1, . . . , r, let f i be a polynomial of degree at most r − 1 with f i (i) = 1 and f i (j) = 0 for j ∈ {1, . . . , r} \ {i}, and let M = {m i,j = f i (j)} j=1,...,c i=1,...,r . Then M {1,...,r} is the identity matrix and thus invertible. Furthermore, any matrix M C with C ⊂ {1, . . . , c} and |C| = r can be mapped onto M {1,...,r} using an invertible matrix given by Lagrange interpolation over points from {1, . . . , c}.
We use the following simple fact about super-invertible matrices. Pick any C ⊂ {1, . . . , c} with |C| = r. First sample x j for j ∈ C using any joint distribution. Then for each j ∈ C sample x j ∈ R Z N uniformly at random, and independent of {x j } j ∈C . Let y = (y 1 , . . . , y r ) = M (x 1 , . . . , x c ). Then y is uniformly random in (Z N ) r .
Paillier's Encryption Scheme
We will use Paillier's public-key encryption scheme, along with a number of known and new tools for this encryption scheme. The public key is N = pq where p and q are O(κ)-bit primes. In addition p = 2p + 1 and q = 2q + 1 where p and q are primes such that p, q, p , q are distinct.
A plaintext m ∈ Z N is encrypted as M = E(m; r) = G m r N mod N 2 , where G = N + 1 and r ∈ R Z * N is uniformly random. The element N + 1 has order N in Z * N 2 and it can be showed that E is a homomorphism from Z N × Z * N to Z * 
Σ-Protocols with Strong Soundness.
We will use a large number of zero-knowledge proofs, all based on Σ-protocols. A Σ-protocol is a three-move proof system. The verifier knows an instance x and the prover knows a witness w for x. The prover sends a first message a sampled using x and w. The verifier returns a challenge e ∈ E for some challenge set E, and then the prover returns a reply c depending on e. Based on the conversation (x, a, e, c) the verifier either accepts or rejects. A conversation is called valid if it is accepted by the verifier. To be called a Σ-protocol the system must be complete and have the following two properties. Special soundness: Given two valid conversations (x, a, e, c) and (x, a, e , c ) with the the same first message a and different challenges e = e one can efficiently compute a witness w for x. Special honest-verifier zero-knowledge: Given any (x, e), where x is a correct instance, meaning that there exists a witness for x, one can efficiently compute (a, c) such that the conversation (x, a, e, c) has a distribution statistically close to that generated by the protocol when run with instance x and challenge e, and the prover knowing a witness for x.
For any pair (x, a), being an instance and a first message, we say that (e, c) is a valid pair if (x, a, e, c) is a valid conversation, and we call e a valid challenge for (x, a) if there exists a valid pair (e , c) for (x, a) with e = e. It follows from the special soundness that a Σ-protocol has the following property: if x is an incorrect instance, meaning an instance which has no witness, then for any (x, a) there exists at most one valid challenge e. We introduce the notion of strong soundness for a Σ-protocol, by which we will mean that if x is an incorrect instance, then for all a for which there exists a valid challenge e for (x, a), this (unique) challenge can be computed efficiently from (x, a). We call a Σ-protocol with strong soundness a strong Σ-protocol.
As we will see later, a Σ-protocol with strong soundness can be turn into a zero-knowledge proof in a particularly simple manner, by letting e = sig sk (nonce) be a signature on some fresh value nonce.
Proof of Plaintext Knowledge. The first strong Σ-protocol is for proving plaintext knowledge. Normally a Paillier encryption is computed as A = G m r N mod N 2 . For generality, we need to consider the case where some other arbitrary element H ∈ Z * N 2 was used in place of G. I.e., the encryption has been computed as A = H m r N mod N 2 . In this case m might be an arbitrary integer, but we assume that a public bound is known such that m ≤ 2 .
Proof of plaintext knowledge 1. The verifier knows an instance x = (H, A) and the prover knows a witness w = (m, r) such that A = H m r N mod N 2 . 2. The prover samples n ∈R Z 2 +κ and s ∈R Z *
and sends the first message a = B. 3. The verifier sends a challenge e ∈ Z Bound , where Bound is a lower bound on the primes p , q . 4. The prover computes z = em + n and t = r e s mod N and sends the reply c = (z, t).
The verifier accepts the conversation if
If ∈ O(κ), as will always be the case, the bit-length of a conversation is seen to be O(κ).
This proof is known to be a Σ-protocol (see e.g. [CDN01] ). We argue that it also has strong soundness. For this we have to consider an incorrect instance x = (H, A), where A = H m r N mod N 2 has no solution for (m, r), and a first message a = B for which there exists e, (z, t) such that 
If we write B = E(m B ; r B ), then using arguments as those above it follows that 
The verifier accepts the proof if H
The bit-length of a conversation is O(κ) bits. Again the proof is known to be a Σ-protocol. The strong soundness can be argued using techniques very similar to those used for the proof of plaintext knowledge. In particular, if for a value
, but still there exists a valid challenge e, then e can be computed efficiently given (x, a) and (p, q).
Homomorphic Conversations
Another notion that we use for efficiency purposes is that of homomorphic conversations. We look at the proof of identical encryption for an example. Let x = (H 0 , H 1 , A 0 , A 1 ) be an instance for the proof system. If the instance is correct there exists (m, r 0 , r 1 ) such that
Assume then that we have correct instances
a correct instance, as it has the witness (m, r 0 , r 1 )
A similar property holds for valid conversations. A value (x, a, e, c) =
1 ) , with the same (H 0 , H 1 ) and the same challenge e. Define A 0 and A 1 as above, and let
is again a valid conversation, now for the combined instance (H 0 , H 1 , A 0 , A 1 ) computed above. We call (x, a, e, c) the combined conversation.
When combining instances and conversations in the following we will simply write a = combine({a i } l=1 ) and c = combine({c i } l=1 ) for the above way to compute the combined first message a and the combined reply c. We later use combined conversations for efficiency purposes. Note that the only value in (x, a, e, c) = (H 0 , H 1 , A 0 , A 1 ), (B 0 , B 1 ), e, (z, t 0 , t 1 ) which is larger than the corresponding value in a normal conversation is z, where z = l=1 z (l) . We will however only combine polynomially many proofs, so z will be an O(κ)-bit value, even in combined proofs.
Distributed Decryption
We then sketch how the decryption function can be distributed. Recall that 
all parties can now efficiently compute m from M 0 . In the following we write this as m = combine(M 1 , . . . , M n ). It can be showed [CDN01] that this distributed decryption protocol does not leak information about d, as the decryption shares M i can be simulated given just M and m, without using the values d i .
To add robustness to the protocol the actual encryption key distributed by the trusted server is of the form ek = (N, com 1 , . . . , com n ), where com i is a commitment to d i . Furthermore, the decryption key share given to P i is of the form dk i = (d i , o i ), where o i is an opening of com i to d i . After sending the decryption share M i = M di mod N 2 the party P i will then prove that com i contains a commitment to a value d i for which it holds that M i = M di mod N 2 . This guarantees that if all parties give acceptable proofs for their decryption share M i , then m = combine(M 1 , . . . , M n ) is the plaintext of M , except with negligible probability.
The proof that com i is a commitment to a value d i such that M i = M di mod N 2 we will call the proof of correct decryption share. The proof is done using a Σ-protocol. We denote the instance by x = (ek, M, M i ) and we call a valid conversation (ek, M, M i ), a, e, c a valid conversation for M i being the decryption share of M from P i . The details of this Σ-protocol have been removed from this extended abstract due to lack of space.
The Σ-protocol for proving correct decryption share has total bit-length O(κ). Furthermore, it has homomorphic conversations, in the following sense: Given n decryption shares M 1 , . . . , M n along with a valid conversation (ek, M, M i ), a i , e, c i for each M i being the decryption share of M from P i , it is possible to compute m = combine(M 1 , . . . , M n ), a = combine(a 1 , . . . , a n ) and c = combine(c 1 , . . . , c n ) such that (ek, M, m), a, e, c is a valid conversation for a Σ-protocol for proving that m is the plaintext of M when ek is the public key. In addition, the Σ-protocol for proving that m is the plaintext of M has strong soundness in the following sense. Given (ek, M, m) where m is not the plaintext of M (when the N in ek is the encryption key) and given any first message a, if there exists a valid challenge e for (ek, M, m), a , then this e can be computed efficiently from (ek, M, m), a given the factorization of N .
Setup, Key-share Backup and Party Elimination
We use P ori = {P 1 , . . . , P n } to denote the original party set which agreed on running the protocol. Before our MPC protocol is run we assume that the following key-distribution has been made. An encryption-key ek for Paillier's encryption scheme has been generated and made public, and P i has been given a decryption key share dk i , as described in Section 4. This means that the decryption key is shared with threshold n − 1. A verification-key/signing-key pair (vk, sk) for a threshold signature scheme has been generated and sk is shared among P ori with threshold n − 1 and P i holding sk i . A verification-key/signing-key pair (vkzk, skzk) for a threshold signature scheme has been generated and skzk is shared among P ori with threshold t = (n − 1)/2 and P i holding skzk i . Finally an auxiliary string has been setup as described in [Dam00] to allow transforming all Σ-protocols into concurrent zero-knowledge proofs.
deal with this issue we use the technique of key-share backup by Rabin [Rab98] . As part of the protocol setup, the key shares sk i and dk i of each P i ∈ P ori are verifiably secret shared among the parties in P ori , with threshold t = (n−1)/2 . The parties then hold an active party set, originally P act = P ori . Then, whenever some protocol fails, the parties will run a detection protocol, detect-eliminate, where all parties in P ori end up agreeing on a subset D ⊂ P act that can be thought of as the active parties causing the failure. Then each P i ∈ P ori will for each P j ∈ D send its shares of dk j and sk j to all parties, and all parties reconstruct dk j and sk j . Then the parties set P act := P act \ D. This ensures that all parties at all times hold dk j and sk j for all eliminated parties P j ∈ P ori \ P act .
As opposed to [Rab98] our detection protocol will not detect only corrupted parties. Our detection protocol will however guarantee that there are at least as many corrupted parties as honest parties in the detected set D. Therefore P act will continue to have honest majority. This is an idea from the party elimination framework from [HMP00, HM01] .
6 Some Sub-Protocols
Transferable Zero-Knowledge Proofs
We need a protocol trans-zk for a party P i to give a short transferable zeroknowledge proof. We assume that there exists a two-party protocol for a prover P i to prove some instance x using a witness w, and we assume that the protocol is zero-knowledge when run concurrently. Such protocols exists for all the problems that we need to prove in zero-knowledge later, as we based all proofs on Σ-protocols which can be made concurrent zero-knowledge using [Dam00] . The protocol trans-zk uses the threshold signature scheme (vkzk, skzk) with threshold t = (n − 1)/2 . trans-zk 1. Pi ∈ P ori has input (sid , Pi, x, w), where sid ∈ {0, 1} κ is a unique session identifier, x is an instance for some proof system and w is a witness for x. Each Pj ∈ P ori \ {Pi} has input (sid, Pi). 2. Pi: Send (sid, x) to each Pj ∈ P ori and use the witness w to run the two-party zero-knowledge proof for x with each Pj . 3. Each Pj ∈ P ori : If Pi sends a value x and gives an accepting zero-knowledge proof for x, then send σj = sig skzk j (sid , i, x) to Pi. a 4. Pi: Collect t + 1 valid signature shares σj on (sid, i, x) and compute a signature σ = combine({σj }j ) on (sid, i, x). Then output proof (sid , i, x) = (sid, σ).
a Here, and for the rest of the paper, whenever a party sends a signature share under skj or skzkj it will give a zero-knowledge proof of correctness to the recipient, and we will not mentioning this explicitly from now on.
The value proof (sid , i, x) is then the transferable proof. If ver vkzk (sid , i, x), σ = 1, then any P j ∈ P ori will accept (sid , σ) as evidence that x was proved by P i in session sid . The proof is clearly zero-knowledge when the underlying zero-knowledge proof is concurrent zero-knowledge. As for soundness, a party P i can only construct a valid transferable proof proof (sid , i, x) by obtaining t + 1 signature shares on (sid , i, x). Since we have assumed that at most a minority of the parties in P ori are corrupted, it follows that a corrupted prover P i must give an accepting proof for x to at least one honest party to construct a valid transferable proof proof (sid , i, x) . This guarantees the soundness. Since t = (n − 1)/2 and we have assumed that a majority of the parties in P ori are honest, an honest prover will always receive t + 1 signature shares on (sid , i, x). This guarantees the completeness of the proof system.
For all the proof systems that we use, the communication complexity of one proof is O(κ). Therefore the total communication complexity of one run of trans-zk is O(nκ), and proofs (sid , σ) have length O(κ).
King-Fail-Detect Protocols
The rest of our sub-protocols will be so-called King-Fail-Detect (KFD) protocols, where all parties have inputs, only active parties have outputs and a designated active party P king ∈ P act acts as King. Each party P i ∈ P ori has some input (sid , P king , x i ), where sid is a unique session identifier. 4 The output of each active party P i ∈ P act will be some value (sid , s i , y i ), where s i ∈ {ok!, failed!} is a termination status. If s i = ok! for all honest P i ∈ P act , then we say that the session succeeded. In that case the values y i constitute the outputs of the protocol. Otherwise, we say that the session failed. If an honest P i ∈ P act has output s i = failed!, then y i = P j for some P j ∈ P act , meaning that P i accuses P j of being corrupted. In words: A KFD protocol is said to fail if some honest, active party considers it failed, and if a KFD protocol fails, then at least one honest active party will accuse some active party of causing the failure.
We put some restrictions on what accusations are allowed by the honest parties. Specifically we require that a KFD protocol has the following two properties. King Awareness: When P king is honest and at least one honest party P i ∈ P act outputs s i = failed! and y i = P king , then P king outputs s king = failed!. Sound Detection: If P king has outputs s king = failed! and y king = P j ∈ P act , then P j is corrupted, and if some honest P i ∈ P act \ {P king } has outputs s i = failed! and y i = P j ∈ P act \ {P king }, then P j is corrupted. In words: No honest party accuses another honest party, except maybe the King. And, if some honest party accuses an honest King, then the King will in turn accuse some corrupted party.
After a KFD protocol the below protocol detect-eliminate will sometimes be run to detect failing parties and eliminate them. The protocol uses the threshold signature scheme (vk, sk) with threshold n − 1.
In Step 2 in detect-eliminate P king is instructed to compute a signature σ on (sid , ok!) when it received correct signature shares σ i = sig ski (sid , ok!) detect-eliminate 1. Each Pi ∈ P act : If si = ok!, then send σi = sig sk i (sid, ok!) to P king . 2. P king : If s king = failed!, then broadcast (corrupt!, y king ) to P ori . Otherwise, if some Pi ∈ P act did not send σi = sig sk i (sid , ok!), then broadcast (complained!, Pi) to P ori , for one of these parties. Otherwise, compute a signature σ on (sid , ok!) and broadcast σ to P ori . 3. Each Pi ∈ P act : If P king broadcast (complained!, Pi), then broadcast (si, yi) to P ori . 4. Each P k ∈ P ori : If P king broadcast (corrupt!, Pj ) with Pj ∈ P act , then let D = {P king , Pj}. If P king broadcast (complained!, Pi) and Pi did not broadcast si = failed! and yi = Pj ∈ P act , then let D = {P king , Pi}. If P king broadcast (complained!, Pi) and Pi broadcast si = failed! and yi ∈ P act , then let D = {Pi, yi}. If P king broadcast σ = sig sk (sid , ok!), then let D = ∅. Otherwise, let D = {P king }. 5. Each P k ∈ P ori : Let P act := P act \ D, and for each Pi ∈ D, reconstruct the key shares dki, ski.
from all P i ∈ P act . This is possible as P king knows sk i for all P i ∈ P act , as these were reconstructed in
Step 5 in earlier runs of detect-eliminate.
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Note that if any honest P i ∈ P act has s i = failed!, then D = ∅, and note that King Awareness and Sound Detection guarantee that there are always at least as many corrupted parties as honest parties in D. So, if the session fails, at least one corrupted party is eliminated, and P act will keep having honest majority. One run of detect-eliminate can be seen to have communication complexity O(nκ + BC) = O(BC).
KFD Signing
We use the below KFD protocol for signing under sk. It is straight-forward to verify that this is a KFD protocol, with King Awareness and Sound Detection. When the protocol succeeds it is clear that all parties received a signature σ on (sid , m king ). Since sk is shared with threshold n − 1 and sid is used only once, it is clear that at most one value (sid, m) is signed for each sid. The communication complexity is O(nκ).
kfd-sign 1. Each Pi ∈ P act has input (sid , P king , mi) for P king ∈ P act , and if P king is honest, then mi = m king for all honest Pi ∈ P act . 2. Each Pi ∈ P act : Send σi = sig sk i (sid , mi) to P king . 3. P king : If some Pi ∈ P act did not send a valid σi, then output (sid, failed!, Pi). Otherwise, compute σi = sig sk i (sid, m king ) for Pi ∈ P ori \ P act , compute σ = combine(σ1, . . . , σn), and send σ to all parties in P act . 4. Each Pi ∈ P act : If receiving σ such that ver vk`( sid , mi´, σ) = 1, then output sid , ok!, (mi, σ)´. Otherwise, output (sid , failed!, P king ).
KFD Broadcast
We use the KFD protocol kfd-broadcast for broadcasting values. A party P j ∈ P ori has a message m which should be sent to all active parties. If m is an instance of some proof system, then the party P j also has a witness w for m which allows P j to give a zero-knowledge proof for m. In that case the broadcast only succeeds if P j can give a proof of m. If the proof fails, the output is some dummy value D.
kfd-broadcast 1. Some Pj ∈ P ori has input (sid , P king , Pj , m, w, D) for P king ∈ P act , and each Pi ∈ P act \ {Pj } has input (sid , P king , Pj , D). 2. Pj: Run trans-zk(sid , Pj, m, w) to get proof (sid, j, m). The other parties have input (sid, Pj ). 3. Pj: Send`sid , m, proof (sid , j, m)´to each Pi ∈ P act . 4. Each Pi ∈ P act : If receiving`sid, m , proof (sid , j, m )´from Pj, then send it to P king . 5. P king : If receiving any`sid , m , proof (sid, j, m )´from any Pi ∈ P act , then pick one of them,`sid , m, proof (sid , j, m)´, and send it to each Pi ∈ P act . 6. Each Pi ∈ P act : If`sid , m , proof (sid , j, m )´was sent to P king in
Step 4, but P king did not return any`sid , m, proof (sid, j, m)´in
Step 5, then output (sid , failed!, P king ). Otherwise, run kfd-sign(sid , P king , mi) (with P king as King) a , where mi is determined as follows. If P king sent sid , m, proof (sid , j, m)´, then mi = m, and otherwise mi = D. 7. Each Pi ∈ P act : If kfd-sign outputs ok!, then output (sid , ok!, mi). Otherwise, output (sid, failed!, P king ).
a For the rest of the paper, when a KFD protocol runs another KFD protocol, it calls it with its own King, and we do not mention this explicitly.
It is easy to verify that kfd-broadcast is a KFD protocol. Assume then that the protocol succeeds. In that case kfd-sign terminated without failure, so all honest P i ∈ P act had the same input m i . Therefore all honest P i ∈ P act output the same m i . It is easy to see that if in addition P j is honest, then m i = m, were m is the input of P j . Finally, observe that if P j cannot prove m, then the output of all honest P i ∈ P act will be the dummy value D. Let = |m|. If ≥ κ, the communication complexity is seen to be O(n ).
KFD Promote
The following KFD sub-protocol allows to promote a vector x 0 , . . . , x −1 of κ-bit values, known only by active parties, to all parties. This can be done with communication complexity O(n κ + n 2 κ) = O(n κ + BC) following an idea of [FH06] .
KFD Decryption
The KFD sub-protocol kfd-decrypt allows to decrypt an agreed ciphertext M toward all active parties. The decryption is performed through a King P king . The kfd-promote 1. Each Pi ∈ P act has input`sid , P king , (x0, . . . , x −1 )´and each Pj ∈ P ori \ P act has input (sid , P king , ).
2. Each Pj ∈ P ori : Let f (z) = P −1 l=0 x l z l be the polynomial constituted of the coefficients x l , and let mi be the vector with the ith block of 2 /|P act | values on f (z), i.e., mi =`f (i · 2 /|P act | ), . . . , f ((i + 1) · 2 /|P act | − 1)´. 3. Each Pj ∈ P act : Invoke kfd-sign, to compute signatures σi on mi for every Pi ∈ P act . 4. Each Pi ∈ P act : Send ( mi, σi) to every Pj ∈ P ori \ P act . 5. Each Pj ∈ P ori \ P act : Accept those vectors mi with good signature σi, and uses them to interpolate f (z) and compute (x0, . . . , x −1 ).
protocol assumes that the parties in P act agree on M , and does not guarantee that all active parties receive the decryption m (this will be detected in detecteliminate), but it guarantees that no party outputs a wrong decryption m. The protocol uses the homomorphic proofs for correct decryption share.
kfd-decrypt 1. Each Pi ∈ P act has input (sid, P king , ek, M, dki). 2. Each Pi ∈ P act : Compute decryption share Mi = D dk i (M ) and send Mi to P king , along with the first message ai in a proof that Mi is the correct decryption share from Pi. 3. P king : For Pi ∈ P ori \ P act , use dki to compute Mi = D dk i (M ) and the first message ai in a proof that Mi is the correct decryption share from Pi. Compute m = combine(M1, . . . , Mn) and a = combine(a1, . . . , an) and kfd-broadcast (m, a) to each Pi ∈ P act . 4. Each Pi ∈ P act : Run kfd-sign on (sid ) to receive e = sig sk (sid). 5. Each Pi ∈ P act : Using e as challenge, compute the reply ci for the proof begun in Step 2. Send ci to P king . 6. P king : If for some Pi ∈ P act the value`(ek, M, Mi), ai, e, ci´is not a valid conversation for Mi being the decryption share of M from Pi, then output (sid, failed!, Pi). Otherwise, for each Pi ∈ P ori \ P act , use dki to compute the reply ci of the proof begun in Step 3, using e as challenge. Then compute c = combine(c1, . . . , cn) and send c to all parties. 7. Each Pi ∈ P act : If`(ek, M, m), a, e, c´is not a valid conversation for m being the plaintext of M , then output (sid, failed!, P king ). Otherwise, output (sid, ok!, m).
The protocol is a KFD protocol, with King Detection and Sound Detection: If any KFD sub-protocol fails, the parties adopt the accusation from the first one to fail. If all KFD sub-protocols succeed, but some party P i ∈ P act does not give a valid conversation (ek, M, M i ), a i , e, c i , then P king outputs (sid , failed!, P i ). Otherwise, P king will, by the homomorphic-conversations property, always compute a valid conversation (ek, M, m), a, e, c for m being the plaintext of M . Therefore no honest party will output (sid , failed!, P king ).
We then consider the correctness of the protocol, by which we mean that no honest party outputs (sid , m) with m = D(M ). Assume for the sake of contradiction that some PPT adversary can control the corrupted parties in such a way that some honest party outputs (sid , m) with m = D(M ). Consider the proof given by P king from the viewpoint of an honest P i ∈ P act . In Step 3 P king sends (m, a) . Then e = sig sk (sid ) is generated, and in Step 6 P king then sends c such that (ek, M, m), a, e, c is a valid conversation for m being the plaintext of M . Since m is not the plaintext of M , it follows from the strong soundness that using the factorization (p, q) of N one can compute from (m, a) the one challenge e = e(p, q, M, m, a) for which there exists c such that (ek, M, m), a, e , c is a valid conversation. Since (ek, M, m), a, e = sig sk (sid ), c is a valid conversation (otherwise, P i would not output (sid , m)), it follows that e(p, q, M, m, a) = sig sk (sid ). Since the use of kfd-broadcast ensures that all P i ∈ P act receive the same (m, a), we can consider the point were (m, a) is received by the first honest P i ∈ P act . At this point one can use (p, q) to compute sig sk (sid ) = e(p, q, M, m, a). However, at this point in the protocol no honest party P i ∈ P act has yet input (sid ) to kfd-sign, so by the security of kfd-sign, it should be infeasible to compute sig sk (sid ). Since the security of kfd-sign does not depend on (p, q) being hidden, we have a contradiction. This argument can easily be turned into a formal reduction to the unforgeability of sig sk .
We then consider the privacy of the protocol. Revealing the decryption shares leaks no additional information as they can be simulated from M and the plaintext m. We therefore just have to ensure that the proofs of correct decryption share do not leak any additional information. This follows from the fact that the proofs can be simulated given only the decryption shares M i and the plaintext m, and especially without using d i . Instead of d i the simulator will use the signing key sk. Recall namely that the proofs of correct decryption shares are performed using a Σ-protocol, and observe that knowing sk allows the simulator to compute the challenge e = sig sk (sid ) before the proof is run. Using the instance (ek, M, M i ) and the challenge e the simulator can apply the special honest-verifier zero-knowledge property to compute a first message a i and a reply c i for each honest P i ∈ P act , such that (ek, M, M i ), a i , e, c i ) has a distribution statistically close to that in the protocol. Then the simulator sends a i to P king . When e = sig sk (sid ) is output by kfd-sign, the simulator then simply sends the preprocessed c i as reply.
Random Encrypted Elements
The next KFD sub-protocol, kfd-random, allows the parties to generate a common ciphertext B, where the plaintext D(B) is computationally indistinguishable to the corrupted parties from a uniformly random value from Z N . For efficiency many such values are generated in parallel.
Let H consist of the indices i of the honest P i ∈ P act , and let C consist of the indices j of the corrupted P j ∈ P act . Note that by the assumption that P act has honest majority we have that |H| ≥ t +1. Consider the ciphertexts (R 1 , . . . , R n ). For i ∈ H, the value r i = D(R i ) is computationally indistinguishable to the kfd-random 1. Each Pi ∈ P act has input (sid , P king ), where P king ∈ P act . Let n = |P act | and t = (n −1)/2 . For notational convenience assume P act = {P1, . . . , P n }. 2. Each Pi ∈ P act : Compute Ri = E(ri; ρi) for uniformly random ri ∈ ZN , ρi ∈ Z * N . Then kfd-broadcast Ri along with a proof of plaintext knowledge for Ri. The dummy value is D = E(0; 1). 3. Each P k ∈ P act : Now n values Ri were received. Using some fixed agreed upon scheme, pick a super-invertible matrix S = {sj,i} i=1,...,n j=1,...,t +1 with t + 1 rows and n columns. Then for j = 1, . . . , t + 1,
corrupted parties from a uniformly random value from Z N , by semantic security. For j ∈ C, the proof of plaintext knowledge (along with the choice of dummy value) guarantees that the value r j = D(R j ) is known by P j , and thus the corrupted parties. Since the corrupted parties have no knowledge on r i for i ∈ H and they know r j for j ∈ C, it follows that to the corrupted parties, the vector (r 1 , . . . , r n ) looks as a vector with |C| values chosen by themselves and then filled in with |H| independent, uniformly random values r i . Since S is a superinvertible matrix with n columns and t + 1 ≤ |H| rows, it follows that to the corrupted parties the vector (b 1 , . . . , b t +1 ) = S(r 1 , . . . , r n ) looks as a uniformly random vector from (Z N ) t +1 . By the homomorphic properties of the encryption function it follows that D(B j ) = b j for j = 1, . . . , t + 1. It therefore follows that kfd-random outputs encrypted values which to the corrupted parties look independent and uniformly random. This is exactly what we need from the protocol.
The communication complexity is given by the n runs of kfd-broadcast on O(κ)-bit values, giving a total communication complexity of O(n nκ). The protocol generates t + 1 = Θ(n ) outputs. To generate outputs the protocol will be run /(t + 1) ≤ /(t + 1) + 1 times in parallel. In that case the communication complexity is O(n κ + n 2 κ) = O(n κ + BC).
Recall that each output B was generated as B = n i=1 R si i mod N 2 for a row (s 1 , . . . , s n ) in S, and P i knows r i and ρ i such that R i = E(r i ; ρ i ). Therefore all parties can compute B i = R 
Random Encrypted Multiplication Triples
Our last KFD sub-protocol, kfd-triples, allows the parties to generate a triple The protocol is a KFD protocol, with King Detection and Sound Detection: If any KFD sub-protocol fails, the parties adopt the accusation from the kfd-triples 1. First kfd-random is run to generate random encryptions. Two of these are taken and renamed to A and B. All parties know {Bi}P i ∈P act such that B = Q P i ∈P act Bi mod N 2 , and Pi knows (bi, βi) such that Bi = E(bi; βi) =
for uniformly random γi ∈R Z * N , and send Ci to P king , along with the first message ai in a proof that there
and kfd-broadcast (C, a). 4. Each Pi ∈ P act : On (C, a), run kfd-sign on (sid ) to receive e = sig sk (sid ). 5. Each Pi: Compute the reply ci in the proof begun in Step 2, using e as challenge.
Send ci to P king . 6. P king : If for any Pi ∈ P act the value`(G, A, Bi, Ci), ai, e, ci´is not a valid conversation, then output (sid, failed!, Pi). Otherwise, compute c = combine({ci}P i ∈P act ) and send c to all parties. 7. Each Pi ∈ P act : If`(G, A, B, C), a, e, c´is not a valid conversation for the claim that there exists (b, β, γ) such that that
first one to fail. If all KFD sub-protocol succeed, but some party P i ∈ P act does not give a valid conversation (G, A, B i , C i ), a i , e, c i , then P king outputs (sid , failed!, P i ). Otherwise, P king can, by the homomorphic-conversations property, always compute a valid (G, A, B, C), a, e, c . Therefore no honest party will output (sid , failed!, P king ).
As for the correctness, notice that the use of kfd-broadcast guarantees that when kfd-triples succeeds, then the honest P i ∈ P act output a common value (A, B, C). And, as for kfd-decrypt, it follows from the strong soundness and the unforgeability of sig sk that when the protocol succeeds, then except with negligible probability there exists (b, β, γ) such that that
As for the privacy, the encryption C i = A bi γ N i mod N 2 hides b i , and the proofs can be simulated without b i using the simulation technique from kfd-decrypt.
To generate triples, the protocol is run times in parallel. In that case the communication complexity in bits is O(n κ + BC). Namely, the communication complexity for generating 2 random values using kfd-random is O(n κ + BC). The extra communication complexity per triple is then given by the run of kfd-broadcast and kfd-sign, each O(nκ), and sending a constant number of O(κ)-bit values between P king and each of the other parties.
The MPC Protocol
In the MPC protocol eval the parties are given an acyclic circuit Circ = {G gid }, where each G gid is a gate with gate identifier gid ∈ {0, 1} κ . Each gate is of one of the following types:
Input gate (gid, in, i): Let P i ∈ P ori give a secret input x gid . Multiplication gate (gid, mul, gid 1 , gid 2 ): x gid ← x gid1 x gid2 mod N . Linear gate (gid, lin, a 0 , a 1 , gid 1 , . . . , a , gid ): x gid ← a 0 + l=1 a l x gid l . Random gate (gid, ran): A secret x gid ∈ Z N is sampled uniformly at random. Global output gate (gid, gout, gid 1 ): Let every P i ∈ P ori learn x gid1 . Local output gate (gid, lout, gid 1 , i): Let P i ∈ P ori , and only P i , learn x gid1 .
We assume that we are given a segmentation (Seg 1 , . . . , Seg m ) of the circuit, such that the value of every gate in Seg i only depends on values of gates in Seg j with j ≤ i. Furthermore, we require that if a segment contains an output gate, then it does not contain an input or a random gate. This requirement is made to ensure that if a segment is evaluated twice in a row, then all outputs will be the same. This is needed for privacy reasons. If in addition it should not be possible for the parties to pick inputs based on earlier outputs, all segments containing input gates should appear before all segments containing output gates.
During the protocol a party P i ∈ P act stores a representation (gid, X gid ) for some gates gid. These values will be consistent in the sense that all parties storing a value (gid, X gid ) for some gid agree on X gid . When gid is an output gate, then X gid ∈ Z N is a plaintext, and otherwise X gid ∈ Z * N 2 is a ciphertext. For an input gate (gid, in, i) to be called correct we require that P i gave a proof of plaintext knowledge for X gid . When P i is honest, we also require that D(X gid ) = x gid . When (gid, in, i) is correct we define V(gid) = D(X gid ). We extend V(·) to the rest of the circuit by V(gid) = V(gid 1 )V(gid 2 ) mod N for multiplication gates and V(gid) = a 0 + l=1 a l V(gid l ) mod N for linear gates. We then call a multiplication or linear gate correct if D(X gid ) = V(gid), and we say that a global output gate is correct if X gid = V(gid 1 ). The goal is to end up with all gates in Circ being correct and all parties P i ∈ P ori holding (gid, X gid ) for all output gates.
It is straightforward to see that the inputs to detect-eliminate in Step 2e have King Awareness and Sound Detection: If any of the KFD sub-protocols fail, the parties adopt the accusation from the first one to fail, and if no KFD subprotocol fails and yet some active honest party does not have a representation of all output gates at the end of the protocol, then clearly P king itself is corrupted.
The use of kfd-broadcast ensures that all parties receiving values receive the same values. Therefore the stored representations are at all times consistent.
That the circuit is at all times correct follows from the homomorphic properties of E. For a linear gate it holds that D(
Each Pi ∈ P ori has input Circ = (Seg 1 , . . . , Seg m ) and x gid ∈ ZN for every (gid, in, i) ∈ Circ. Let P act = P ori and let cur = 1. 2. Terminate if cur > m, otherwise, let Seg = Seg cur and let P king denote the party in P act with the smallest index.
(a) (Prepare multiplication triples) Run kfd-triples with P king to generate triples (A gid , B gid , C gid ) for each (gid, mul, ·, ·), (gid, ran) ∈ Seg. (b) (Evaluate segment) Every gate G gid ∈ Seg is evaluated (in parallel) as soon as its source-gates have been evaluated. Input: For (gid, in, i), Pi ∈ P ori generates X gid ← E(x gid ) and kfdbroadcast the encryption X gid along with a proof of plaintext knowledge, with P king as King and D = E(0; 1) as dummy value. Every Pj stores the value X gid broadcasted by Pi as (gid, X gid ). Random: For (gid, ran), Pi ∈ P act stores (gid, A gid ). Linear function: For (gid, lin, a0, a1, gid1, . . . , a , gid ), let X gid = E(a0; 1)`Q l=1 X a l gid l´m od N 2 , and store (gid, X gid ). Multiplication: For (gid, mul, gid1, gid2), run kfd-decrypt on X gid 1 A gid mod N 2 and X gid 2 B gid mod N 2 . Let α and β be the respective outputs, let X gid = E(αβ; 1)B −α gid A −β gid C gid mod N 2 , and store (gid, X gid ). Global output: For (gid, gout, gid1), let X gid = X gid 1 , run kfd-decrypt on X gid , and let x gid be the output. Store (gid, x gid ). Local output: For (gid, lout, gid1, i), Pi ∈ P ori selects a random blinding b gid ∈R ZN , and the parties first evaluate (gid, in, i) for input b gid , resulting in an encryption B gid , then evaluate (gid, gout, ·) for the encryption X gid = X gid 1 B gid mod N 2 , and store the blinded result (gid, x gid ). (c) (Result promotion) Let be the number of global and local outputs in Seg.
Invoke kfd-promote with input (x gid 1 , . . . , x gid ) to promote these values from P act to P ori . Parties Pi ∈ P ori \ P act store (gid, x gid ) for every output x gid . (d) (Result unblinding) Every party Pi ∈ P ori with local output (gid, lout, ·, i) ∈ Seg stores (gid, x gid − b gid mod N ). (e) (Detect and eliminate) Each Pi ∈ P act : Run detect-eliminate with input (si, yi) derived as follows. If some KFD sub-protocol terminated with output si = failed!, then use the accusation yi from the first one to fail. Otherwise, if all KFD sub-protocols output si = ok!, but a value (gid, ·) was not stored for all gates G gid ∈ Seg, then use si = failed! and yi = P king . Otherwise, use si = ok!. Since the circuit is at all times correct and a segment only succeeds if all active parties end up with a representation of all gates in the segment, it follows that when a segment succeeds, then X gid = V(gid) for all output gates gid at all active parties. The correctness of kfd-promote then guarantees that all parties end up storing gid, V(gid) for all output gates (gid, gout, gid 1 ) ∈ Seg, and the correctness of local outputs is guaranteed by the correctness of the (blinded) global outputs.
The privacy of the protocol follows as for previous MPC protocols based on threshold homomorphic encryption (see e.g. [CDN01] ). The important point being that e.g. α = D(X gid1 ) + D(A gid ) mod N leaks no information to the corrupted parties, as D(A gid ) looks uniformly random to them and thus blinds D(X gid1 ). The privacy of local output is guaranteed by the blinding chosen by the output party.
As for the communication complexity it can be seen that evaluating Seg cur generates communication O(|Seg cur |nκ + BC) bits. We can divide the circuit Circ of any function into m = O(n) segments of size at most |Circ|/n , and evaluating Circ requires evaluation of at most m + t = O(n) segments. Hence, the total communication complexity is O(|Circ|nκ + n BC) bits.
Conclusions
Any function can be securely evaluated by n parties with communication O(|Circ|nκ + n BC) bits, where Circ is a circuit computing the function, κ is the security parameter, and BC is the communication complexity of broadcast. The communication complexity is linear in the number of parties, for all types of gates, including multiplication, input and output gates.
